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I. 
Supplement to Statement of the Case 
Recent Developments and Admissions in Rindlesbach 's Bankruptcy Case 
Rindlesbach appealed the Bankruptcy Comi's Settlement Order1 to the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. In re Rindlesbach, Case No. 2: 14-cv-00577 
(the "Federal Court Appeal"). He argued that the Settlement Order was erroneous in that 
it allowed for entry of a "post-discharge" judgment against him in the trial court in this 
case, thereby violating his discharge. The Hardy Lenders moved to dismiss the appeal for 
mootness and based on Rindlesbach's lack of standing, among other grounds. On 
May 28, 2015, that comi issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss (copy attached hereto as Addendum 2). In that opinion the court 
addressed Rindlesbach's standing as follows: 
Post discharge prosecution of claims is contemplated and permitted 
by the bankruptcy code. Section 524( e) allows a creditor to bring or continue 
an action directly against the debtor for the purpose of establishing the 
debtor's liability when establishing liability is a prerequisite to recover from 
another entity. In re Walker, 927 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 1991). This 
exception to section 524(a)'s post-discharge injunction "hinges 'upon the 
condition that the debtor not be personally liable in a way that would interfere 
with the debtor's fresh stmi in economic life."' Id.,· see also Paul v. Iglehart 
(In re Paul), 534 F.3d 1303, 1307-1308 (10th Cir. 2008). Under UTAH 
CODE ANN. §25-6-6, the transfers in question would only be fraudulent if 
the Hardy Lenders had a claim against Debtor that arose before the transfers 
were made. Because the state court dismissed Debtor from the guaranty 
action for lack of personal liability, the entry of judgment against him may 
be necessary to avoid preclusion issues that could hinder recovery from third 
parties. 
Given that judgments for discharged debts are void pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 524, it is improbable that Debtor will be harmed by the entry of a 
judgment in the Guaranty Action. In the event that the Hardy Lenders were 
to attempt to collect on the state court judgment, Debtor would have recourse 
1 Terms used herein have the same definitions set forth in the Brief of Appellants. 
to seek sanctions for violation of the discharge order. In re Paul, 534 F.3d at 
1306-7. Debtor has also failed to present any evidence that a void post 
discharge judgment would affect his credit prospects beyond the impact that 
his Chapter 7 bankruptcy-which will remain on his credit report for ten 
years-has already had, that he will not be able to persuade creditors that the 
claims have been discharged, or that he will receive credit on less favorable 
terms. Because Debtor bears the burden of establishing he has standing, he 
cannot rely on mere speculative harm. As such, the court concludes that 
Debtor lacks standing to appeal from the Judgment Provision. 
Addendum 2 at 6-7 (footnotes omitted). 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss Appeal2 Rindlesbach 
made the following statements: 
[T]he Settlement Agreement in bankruptcy court provided a final 
adjudication of the amount owed in an allowed claim and the functional 
equivalent of a judgment which supersedes any proceedings in state court. 3 
[T]he Order approving the Settlement Agreement allows their claim and 
therefore gives them a judgment which fixes the amount they can collect 
when using the avoiding actions. 4 
There is simply no reason for a state court judgment where the Order, 
allowing the claim for $2,610,000, is all that is needed to resolve the appellate 
dispute and liquidate the amount which is payable and can be paid through 
the estate's assets including pursuit of avoiding actions.5 
2 A copy of the pertinent portions of this Memorandum is attached as Addendum 3. 
3 Addendum 3 at 7 (ECF pagination is 12). 
4 Id. at 27 (ECF page number 32). 
5 Id. at 3 8 (ECF page number 43 ). 
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2. Procedural History Relevant to Rindlesbach 's Request for Attorney Fees 
After the jury rendered its verdict against the Profit Sharing Plan, Rindlesbach filed 
a Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. R. 7363-7384. The trial court denied the 
motion, reasoning in part as follows: 
This case clearly presents such an extraordinary situation. Indeed, in his 
testimony at trial. Mr. Rind I es back [sic] acknowledged that he had both 
intentionally attempted to defraud the plaintiffs when he executed the 
guarantee as the plan's trustee and that he deliberately lied in his 
deposition testimony. 'T'hus, any award of attorney fees to Mr. Rindlesback 
[sic] would reward his fraudulent and dishonest behavior and I decline to do 
so. Accordingly, I deny Mr. Rindlesback's [ sic ] motion for attorney fees. 
Transcript of Ruling, November 19. 2012, R. 9816-9817 at 4 (emphasis added). 
Argument 
I. Rindlesbach Lacks Standing to Be Heard in this Appeal. 
Rindlesbach repeatedly admitted in the Federal Court Appeal, as quoted at 2 above, 
that the Settlement Order is a final adjudication of the amount of the Hardy Lenders' claim 
against him for purposes of establishing the amount they can collect through fraudulent 
transfer avoidance actions against third parties. He further admitted that such adjudication 
ti "'supersedes any proceedings in state court," as quoted above. 
The Hardy Lenders have made it clear that their aim in this appeal is to is to "bring 
the final outcome in the Third District Court into alignment with [their] Settlement 
Agreement with the Trustee and the Settlement Order of the Bankruptcy Court, thereby 
avoiding a dispute that would otherwise arise because of the apparent conflict between the 
Order of Dismissal and the Settlement Order." Brief of Appellants at 10. That is an issue 
that affects the third parties who are or may become defendants in fraudulent transfer 
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actions, but it has no effect on Rindlesbach, as he is fully protected by his discharge. There 
is a high probability that such third-party defendants will assert the Order of Dismissal as ~ 
preclusive against the Hardy Lenders. Reversal of that Order would serve to clarify, 
simplify and eliminate issues in future litigation-not with Rindlesbach, but with third 
parties. Thus, he has no standing to be heard in this appeal. His transparent purpose is to 
minimize the exposure of his wife and other recipients of his fraudulent transfers by 
seeking to persuade this Com1 to leave the Order of Dismissal in place so that they can 
argue (in stark contrast to his arguments in the Federal Court Appeal) that the Settlement 
Order cannot override the Order of Dismissal. 
For the same reasons stated by Judge Waddoups in dismissing the Federal Court 
Appeal (as quoted above), Rindlesbach also lacks standing to be heard in this appeal. 
However, Rindlesbach argues that the Trustee lacked the power to waive his 
"defenses." The issue of whether or not Utah law holds a trustee personally liable is not a @ 
defense at all. It is simply a question of law as to the existence, or the elements, of a cause 
of action against a trustee. For this reason, none of Rindlesbach's arguments or authorities 
regarding waiver of defenses has any relevance to this case. 
Even if Rindlesbach' s disagreement as to whether the Hardy Lenders have a valid 
cause of action against him personally is considered to be a "defense," the bankruptcy cases 
he cites for the proposition that a trustee may not waive a debtor's defenses are not helpful 
in deciding the actual issue-whether he has standing in this appeal. Close analysis reveals 
that in each of those cases there was a threatened impact on the debtor's pecuniary interests 
that established standing to assert his or her defenses. The debtor in In re Larkin, 468 B .R. 
4 
431 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012), sought to assert her defenses against a mortgage lender's 
foreclosure action that would have deprived her of her exempt homestead. In In re Maier, 
2012 WL 9187579 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012), the court refused to allow the trustee to waive 
the debtor's defenses to an action objecting to the debtor's discharge, stating "if Matheny 
© were to prevail in the adversary proceeding objecting to the Debtor's discharge, the Debtor 
would be liable on the judgment consented to by the Trustee, after having effectively been 
stripped of his defenses in the State Court Case." Id. *3. Likewise, the ruling of In re Nasr, 
120 B.R. 855, 858 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1990), was that the debtor could assert setoff and 
recoupment as affirmative defenses in an adversary proceeding seeking to establish his 
debt as non-dischargeable for fraud pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The court noted 
that the trustee had no incentive to raise any defenses in such a proceeding and that "no 
reason has been shown to bar debtor from raising these defenses." Id. Finally, In re Beach, 
~ 44 7 B.R. 313, 323 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011 ), addressed the question of whether the debtors 
had standing to assert Truth in Lending Act violations against a lender's foreclosure action 
against a home in which the debtors claimed an exemption of $100,000. Because of the 
obvious pecuniary impact on the debtors, they were determined to have standing to raise 
such defenses. 
In sum, the determination as to a debtor's standing in a particular action hinges on 
whether that action would harm his pecuniary interests. Rindlesbach's attempt to divert the 
analysis to a debate over the Trustee's ability to waive defenses is a red herring that only 
distracts from proper analysis of the standing issue. He has no pecuniary interest in 
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fraudulent transfer litigation by the Hardy Lenders against third parties, which is the only 
context in which this appeal matters. Thus, he has no standing to be heard in this appeal. 
Rindlesbach's admissions (quoted above at 2) further demonstrate his lack of 
standing in that he concedes that the Settlement Order is a binding adjudication of his 
liability for purposes of fraudulent transfer litigation against third parties. Why, then, 
should he be heard to object to reversing the Order of Dismissal to prevent those third 
parties from using it to delay and obstruct fraudulent transfer claims against them? The 
Hardy Lenders seek to collect from third parties assets that Rindlesbach has long since 
given away but which rightfully should be made available to pay his creditors. 
Another important distinction between the cases cited by Rindlesbach and the 
present case is that here the banlauptcy court approved the Trustee's waiver of 
Rindlesbach's "defense" (if it be such at all) that he could not be held personally liable on 
the Guaranty under Utah trust law. The bankruptcy court's decision is a fail accompli. @ 
Since Rindlesbach's appeal therefrom has now been dismissed, the bankruptcy court's 
Settlement Order is final and binding, whether or not it was "correct." This Court should 
continue to give full faith and credit to the Settlement Order, as it has already done by 
substituting the Trustee in the place of Rindlesbach in this appeal. The Trustee has 
consented to the relief sought in this appeal. Rindlesbach has no right to oppose it. 
II. This Appeal Is Not Moot. 
Rindlesbach argues that this appeal is moot because reversal would lead to entry of 
a judgment against him that would violate his discharge and because such a judgment 
6 
would exceed the relief sought by the Hardy Lenders in the trial comi. All three elements 
@ of his argument are wrong, as explained below. 
First, reversal of the Order of Dismissal does not mandate entry of a judgment 
against Rindlesbach. The Hardy Lenders explicitly stated in their opening Brief at 19 that 
they seek reversal and remand for further proceedings and that they anticipate that the only 
further proceeding "that will be needed in the trial court is the dismissal of their claim 
against Rindlesbach without prejudice, the matter having been resolved by the Bankruptcy 
Court's Settlement Order." Rindlesbach is merely attacking a straw man of his own 
creation. 
Second, even if a judgment were to be entered against him for the sole purpose of 
establishing his liability as a benchmark for recovery against third-party recipients of 
fraudulent transfers, no violation of his discharge would result. Judge Waddoups ruled in 
~ the Federal Court Appeal that "Section 524(e) allows a creditor to bring or continue an 
action directly against the debtor for the purpose of establishing the debtor's liability when 
establishing liability is a prerequisite to recover from another entity."6 Although it is not 
anticipated to occur on remand, entry of a judgment consistent with the liability determined 
in the Settlement Order would not violate the discharge since the Hardy Lenders have no 
intent or ability to collect from Rindlesbach personally. Rindlesbach is bound by the 
decision of Judge Waddoups resolving that issue. 
6 Addendum 2 at 6 (quotation of full paragraph found at 1 above). 
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Third, this appeal has not been rendered moot on the theory that the requested relief 
cannot affect the rights of the Hardy Lenders. As explained above, their ability to recover 
property fraudulently transferred by Rindlesbach to his wife and others may be delayed, 
complicated, made more expensive or severely impaired if the Order of Dismissal remains 
and is asserted by a transferee as a bar to recovery. Rindlesbach argues that the Hardy 
Lenders have already received everything they asked for in the trial court. That argument 
is erroneous as explained below. 
Paragraph 18 of the Second Amended Complaint (R. 1058-1111) named 
Rindlesbach individually as a defendant and alleged that "Defendants" executed the 
Guaranty. The pleading alleged that the loan had been made in reliance on the Guaranty 
after it had been executed by "all Defendants," that the loan was past due and had not been 
repaid and that Defendants had failed and refused to pay. Every fact required to state a 
claim against Rindlesbach under the Guaranty was plainly alleged. The prayer for relief <ii 
requested a money judgment "against Defendants." Based on a mistake oflaw,7 a footnote 
to the prayer for relief stated that judgment was sought against Rindlesbach in the event 
the court determined that his execution of the Guaranty was not binding on him as Trustee 
of his Profit Sharing Plan. That footnote did not constitute a waiver of the right to obtain 
7 That footnote was included in the prayer for relief because the undersigned counsel was 
under the impression at that time that Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-7-1010( 1) contained in the 
Utah Uniform Trust Code applied to the Profit Sharing Plan. Counsel subsequently became 
aware that the definition of "trust" contained in Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(55) excluded 
"trusts for the primary purpose of paying ... pensions, or employee benefits of any kind . 
. . " and that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-102 made the Utah Uniform Trust Code applicable 
only to trusts "as defined in Section 75-1-201." 
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judgment against both the Plan and Rindlesbach personally because there was no 
@ intentional relinquishment of a known right, as is required to establish a waiver. See IHC 
Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, 116, 196 P.3d 588. 
A further reason why the footnote on which Rindlesbach places such heavy reliance 
Ci carries minimal weight is found in Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(l). It provides that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." In Cowley v. Porter, 2005 
UT App 518, ,r 38, 127 P.3d 1224, 1232, this Court held that Rule 54(c): 
requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate relief justified by 
the facts developed at trial, as long as the failure to request a particular form 
of relief does not prejudice a party in the preparation or trial of the case. If 
there is no prejudice, it is necessary only that the relief granted be supported 
by the evidence and be a permissible form of relief for the claims litigated. 
Rindlesbach has no basis for claiming prejudice in the preparation or trial of the case 
@ following remand, should that occur. In reality, the Hardy Lenders do not intend to seek a 
judgment against him (unless it becomes necessary to counteract future arguments 
advanced by Mrs. Rindlesbach or other fraudulent transferees). Instead, they are asking 
this Court to reverse the Order of Dismissal granting summary judgment. and to remand so 
that the claim against Rindlesbach may be dismissed without prejudice. There can be no 
serious question that judgment against Rindlesbach personally, if it were requested on 
remand, would be supported by the evidence in that he signed the Guaranty, it was breached 
and a money judgment for the indebtedness owing is a permissible form of relief for the 
claim under the Guaranty. Thus, the trial court is required to be liberal in granting the Hardy 
9 
Lenders the relief against Rindlesbach to which they are entitled in view of the facts of this 
case. 
Rindlesbach offers up a litany of other representations and arguments designed to 
persuade the Court that this appeal is moot. He claims that the Hardy Lenders seek a $4 
million8 judgment against Rindlesbach individually. While that was the total amount to 
which the Trustee stipulated, it ignores the fact that only $2.61 million thereof was based 
on the Guaranty claim. The remaining $1.39 million was based on Rindlesbach's liability 
for assets fraudulently transferred to him and resulting interest and attorney fees. His 
argument also ignores the fact that the Hardy Lenders are not requesting entry of judgment 
on remand, but rather propose that the claim against Rindlesbach be dismissed. 
Another argument made by Rindlesbach is that the Hardy Lenders are asking this 
Court to rewrite or reform the Guaranty to make him a signer in his individual capacity. 
That is simply not true. The argument made by the Hardy Lenders is that the legal effect © 
of his signature under the common law is that he can be held liable both personally and in 
his fiduciary capacity. 
Finally, contrary to Rindlesbach's argument, no amendment of the Second 
Amended Complaint is requested or needed. The Hardy Lenders seek remand and 
anticipate that the trial court will dismiss without prejudice. They do not seek amendment 
of pleadings or fmiher litigation in the trial court. Even if they were to request judgment 
8 In the Brief of Appellants at 9, the Hardy Lenders stated that the Settlement Order allowed 
their claim against the bankruptcy estate in the amount of $4 million. It would have been 
more precise to have said "claims" because the $4 million included a Guaranty component 
and $1.39 million for fraudulent transfer liability arising after the Guaranty litigation. 
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against Rindlesbach on remand, however, it would be a request that the trial court honor 
their right under Rule 54(c)(l) to receive the relief to which they are entitled, i.e., judgment 
against Rindlesbach personally if the Order of Dismissal should be reversed. No 
amendment of pleadings is required for Rule 54( c )( 1) to be in force. 
In short, there is no valid argument made by Rindlesbach supporting his contention 
that this appeal has become moot. 
III. Reversal of the Order of Dismissal Is Neither Contrary to the Jury's Verdict 
Nor Would It Create a "Legal Quagmire." 
Rindlesbach contends that consensual reversal of the Order of Dismissal somehow 
contravenes the jury's verdict against the Profit Sharing Plan. He fails to offer a plausible 
vi explanation for that contention, but employs a grab bag of rhetorical techniques such as 
professed confusion as to how Rindlesbach' s fraudulent transfers are relevant to the Hardy 
Lenders' collection of a judgment against the Profit Sharing Plan. He argues without 
coherent explanation that reversal would "spawn continued litigation on an issue outside 
the proceeding" and ''cast doubt on the finality of the judgment against the Plan." Brief of 
Appellees [sic] at 22. The Hardy Lenders' judgment against the Plan is final. Although the 
Plan appealed the Judgment against it, the Plan later allowed its appeal to be dismissed. 
The Hardy Lenders' claims against Rindlesbach, as established by the Settlement Order, 
(ib are twofold: ( 1) a discounted claim of $2.61 million in settlement of the contention that 
Rindlesbach is jointly liable with the Plan for the entire Guaranty obligation and (2) a claim 
of $1.39 million for fraudulent transferee liability and related interest and attorney fees. As 
fi,D creditors of Rindlesbach individually, the Hardy Lenders have the right to seek avoidance 
of his fraudulent transfers of assets to his wife and others. The jury was not asked to 
11 
consider Rindlesbach' s personal liability because the trial court had granted summary 
judgment in his favor prior to trial. 
Rindlesbach complains that the Hardy Lenders seek a $4 million judgment against 
him "on top of'' a $6 million judgment against the Plan. Id. at 21. That is both inaccurate 
and misleading because ( 1) judgment is not being sought against Rindlesbach, (2) his 
liability has been fixed by the Settlement Order (as Rindlesbach conceded in the Federal 
Court Appeal)9, and (3) the $2.61 million (not $4 million) Guaranty claim established by 
the Settlement Order is a joint liability for the same obligation that was reduced to 
Judgment against the Plan and only one satisfaction may be had. 
Reversal of the Order of Dismissal would reduce, rather than increase, litigation 
because it would bring the state of affairs in the State court system into alignment with the 
outcome of Rindlesbach's bankruptcy case. It would clarify what Rindlesbach contends is 
the case already-that "the Order approving the Settlement Agreement allows [the Hardy 
Lenders'] claim and therefore gives them a judgment which fixes the amount they can 
collect when using the avoiding actions." Addendum 3 at 27 (ECF page number 32). 
Reversal would have the prophylactic effect of eliminating a potential hiding place for the 
recipients of Rindlesbach's fraudulent transfers by preventing them from claiming that the 
Order of Reversal establishes that he has no liability under the Guaranty notwithstanding 
the terms of the Settlement Order to the contrary. 
9 See quotations from Rindlesbach's Memorandum in the Federal Court Appeal at 2 above. 
12 
IV. Reversal Pursuant to Stipulation Is Consistent with Sound Public Policy. 
Rindlesbach urges that public policy is promoted by a rigid refusal to reverse a 
judgment pursuant to stipulation of the parties on appeal. While some appellate courts have 
traditionally been unwilling to reverse a trial court's judgment based on stipulation of the 
parties, the better reasoned approach is that taken in Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of 
California, 834 P.2d 119, 125 (California 1992) 10 (in bank), as discussed and quoted in the 
Brief of Appellants at 10-12. In Neary the California Supreme Court decided on a 5 to 1 
vote to reverse the California Court of Appeals' refusal to grant a stipulated reversal. 
Because there was a dissenting opinion, Neary contains a thorough discussion of the public 
policy issues on both sides of this issue. Rindlesbach concedes that there is no clear 
precedent in Utah on this issue. The Hardy Lenders submit that, upon a careful weighing 
of the policy considerations discussed in Neary, this Court should embrace the approach 
~ that allows an appeal to be resolved by a consensual reversal. Further, the Court should 
apply that approach in this case by granting the Motion to Reverse. 
V. The Order of Dismissal Is Contrary to Utah's Common Law. 
Rindlesbach disparages the time-honored common law rule that a trustee is 
personally liable for contractual obligations undertaken in his capacity as trustee of a trust, 
referring to it as "antiquated" and claiming that the Hardy Lenders seek to "rewind a 
hundred years oflegal development." Brief of Appellees [sic] at 26, 28. The great majority 
of the cases cited by the Hardy Lenders, however, are neither antiquated nor one hundred 
10 Superseded by statute as noted in Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert, 124 Cal. App. 4th 999, 
1005-06, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835, 83 8-39 (2004 ), as modified (Jan. 4, 2005) 
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years old. In their opening Brief, they cited cases decided in 2004 (New York law), 11 2000 
(Maine), 1992 (Massachusetts), 1985 (Illinois), 1984 (Colorado), 1977 (Florida) and 1958 @ 
(United States District Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applying Utah law). 
Further, Rindlesbach incorrectly asserts that there is a complete lack of authority for 
the proposition that a trustee may be held personally liable in addition to being liable in his 
fiduciary capacity. At least one of the cases cited by the Hardy Lenders, however, did 
precisely that. See Maine Shipyard & Marine Ry. v. Lilley, 2000 ME 9, ,r,r 13-16, 743 A.2d 
1264, 1268-69 (Maine 2000) ("The court did not err when it held Daniel Lilley jointly 
liable with the Lilley Trust for unjust enrichment."). Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. 
Gibbons, 168 F.Supp. 867 ( 1958), involved an action against the trustee both individually 
and as trustee, but it is unclear whether the judgment was entered against him in both 
capacities. 
Noteworthy by its absence in Rindlesbach's Brief is any mention of the profound ~ 
significance of the actions of the Utah Legislature in ( 1) adopting the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1975 with a provision limiting personal liability of trustees but only if they are 
trustees of donative trusts such as those used in estate planning, (2) adopting the Uniform 
Trust Code in 2004, again with a provision limiting personal liability of trustees but only 
if they are trustees of donative trusts and (3) stating in 1975 and again in 2004 that the 
common law ( or "principles of law and equity") shall remain in force except as specifically 
11 Societe Generate v. US. Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 325 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
affd sub nom. Societe Generate v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 144 F. App'x 191 (2d Cir. 2005). @ 
Counsel has discovered that the citation to this case in the Hardy Lenders' opening brief 
omitted the "2d" in the F .Supp. citation, for which mistake counsel apologizes. 
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modified by the legislative acts. See Brief of Appellants at 15-18. As discussed on those 
pages, the omission of business trusts and retirement trusts from the provision limiting 
personal liability must be presumed to have been purposeful so as to retain the previous 
common law rule with respect to those types of trusts. 
VI. Rindlesbach's Request for Attorney Fees Has No Merit. 
For the reasons given by the trial court in denying Rindlesbach's Motion for Award 
of Attorney Fees and Costs, as quoted in part at 3 above, the Court should not award any 
attorney fees to Rindlesbach in the event that he prevails in this appeal. Rindlesbach's 
conduct in the trial court showed a wanton disregard for the truth and for the integrity of 
the judicial system. Rindlesbach admitted that he deliberately lied. He deliberately 
manipulated and undermined the judicial system and the cause of justice to avoid liability 
to the Hardy Lenders. It would be diametrically contrary to the interests of justice and 
@l) equity to reward such pernicious behavior by forcing the Hardy Lenders to compensate 
him for attorney fees that directly and foreseeably resulted from his own lies, his own bad 
faith and his own wanton disregard for the integrity of the judicial system. 
Conclusion and Relief Sought 
The Hardy Lenders and the Trustee, who stands in Rindlesbach's shoes by reason 
of his decision to seek relief in the Bankruptcy Court, have compromised and settled any 
dispute as to the validity and amount of the Hardy Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach. The 
Motion to Reverse based on their Stipulation to Reverse should be granted. 
If the Court nevertheless wishes to consider the merits of the Order of Dismissal, 
that order should be reversed. Under the common law in Utah a trustee is personally liable 
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on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity. Both when the Utah Legislature enacted 
the Uniform Probate Code in 1975 and when it repealed and replaced parts of it with the Gi 
Uniform Trust Code in 2004, it narrowly defined "trust" to exclude retirement trusts and 
expressly mandated that the common law would continue to apply except as modified by 
statute. 
The Court should reverse the Order of Dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. The Hardy Lenders anticipate that the only further proceeding that will be 
needed in the trial court is the dismissal of their claim against Rindlesbach without 
prejudice, his liability having been resolved by the Bankruptcy Court's Settlement Order. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2015. 
PRJNCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
A Professional Corporation 
/ lo 
By\/~ 
J~ C. Swindler ----
Attorney for Appellants 
Certificate of Compliance with Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l) 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Brief, exclusive of cover sheet, table of 
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Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MARK LEE RINDLESBACH, et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
PHILIP G. JONES, et al., 
Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING APPELLEES' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Case No. 2: l 4-cv-00577 
Judge Clark Waddoups 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Philip G. Jones, Chapter 7 Trustee 
for the bankruptcy estate of Mark Lee Rindlesbach ("Trustee"), (Dkt. No. 25); and The Ruth B. 
Hardy Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse 
P.S.P., MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah Investments, LLC, David D. Smith, Steven Condie, 
David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and D.R.P. 
Management PSP ("Hardy Lenders,,), (Dkt. No. 29). The court held oral argument on May 5, 
2015, and took the matters under advisement. After carefully considering the parties' briefs and 
oral arguments, the court GRANTS the Trustee's and the Hardy Lenders' Motions to Dismiss on 
the grounds that this appeal is notjusticiable. 
BACKGROUND 
This appeal arises out of Mark Lee Rindlesbach's ("Debtor") bankruptcy, and the 
Trustee's settlement of the Hardy Lenders' claims. On May 25, 2007, the Hardy Lenders made a 
~ 
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loan of $3.3 million to Eagle Mountain Lots, LLC, for the acquisition of land in Eagle Mountain, 
Utah. Debtor, as trustee for the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan ("Plan"), was 
one of the guarantors for the loan. When Eagle Mountain Lots defaulted, the Hardy Lenders filed 
suit against the guarantors in July 2008, and after amending the complaint, against Debtor in his 
personal capacity, ("Guaranty Action"). Prior to and during the pendency of the suit, Debtor 
transferred various parcels of real property from his ownership, as well as from various entities 
where Debtor was a partial owner. (Bankr. Dkt. No. 295, pp. 5-10, 35-37). The state trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Debtor, finding that he was not personally liable on the 
guaranty. The Hardy Lenders have appealed that decision, which is now pending in the Utah 
Court of Appeals. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Hardy Lenders for their claim against 
the Plan, and on December 3, 2012, the state court entered a judgment in the amount of 
$6,367,203.64. 
On November 5, 2012, and January 9, 2013, the Hardy Lenders initiated two fraudulent 
transfer actions in state court in Tooele and Salt Lake Counties, contending that after the jury 
rendered a verdict in the Guaranty Action, Debtor transferred most of the assets out of the Plan 
and personally retained a portion of the sale profits, ("Fraudulent Transfer Actions"). The state 
court in the Salt Lake County action ordered Debtor to deposit $2.2 million into the registry of the 
court pending resolution of the claims. Debtor failed to surrender the entire amount required by 
the court order. In light of that, and for other violations of the court's orders, an Order to Show 
Cause was entered, and an evidentiary hearing was held on August 26, 2013. At the hearing, the 
state court made a bench ruling holding Debtor in contempt, and ordered him to deposit the 
remaining funds with the court and pay the Hardy Lenders' expenses for the contempt 
proceedings. Instead of complying, Debtor filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 on 
2 
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September 13, 2013. The automatic stay placed the Hardy Lender's appeal and the Fraudulent 
Transfer Actions on hold, and prevented the entry of a written contempt order. The bankruptcy 
was converted to a Chapter 7 case on January 13, 2014. 
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the Hardy Lenders asserted claims totaling $17,524,705.13, 
comprised of $7,030,836.74 (and potentially up to $9,249,535.64) for their Guaranty Action 
appeal arguing that Debtor is personally liable for the state court guaranty judgment, 
$3,592,703.24 for the claims made in the Fraudulent Transfer Actions, 1 and $5,000,000.00 for a 
punitive damages claim. On May 21, 2014, the bankruptcy Trustee entered into an agreement 
with the Hardy Lenders to settle their outstanding claims against the bankruptcy estate. Under the 
settlement, the Hardy Lenders agreed to pay the Trustee $500,000.00, with both parties releasing 
each other from any claims or obligations other than those specified in the settlement. In 
exchange, the Trustee agreed to allow the Hardy Lenders' claims in the reduced amount of 
$4,000,000.00, subordinated to all other unsecured claims against the estate. Specifically, the 
settlement allowed $2,610,000.00 for the personal liability claim, $1,390,000.00 for the 
fraudulent transfer claim, and $0 for the punitive damages claim. 
The settlement further assigned to the Hardy Lenders "any and all claims and causes of 
action of or available to the Trustee or the Estate." The Hardy Lenders were required to pay 5% of 
the net recovery to the holders of unsecured claims in proportion to their allowed amounts, to the 
extent that the claims were still outstanding, ("Assignment Provision"). Finally, the settlement 
allowed for the modification of the automatic stay to allow prosecution of the pending state court 
appeal in the Guaranty Action and to permit the state court to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the contempt proceeding; with an agreement that the Trustee was to 
1 Of this amount, $317,533.75 is duplicative with the personal liability claim. 
3 
r 
i 
I 
@ 
Case 13-30552 Doc 518 Filed 05/28/15 Entered 05/28/15 14:40:55 Desc Main 
Case 2:14-cv-00577-C\l100l1llmaflocunlimgESca dfillfSj 05/28/15 Page 4 of 13 
stipulate to the entry of a consent order in the Utah Court of Appeals reversing or vacating 
summary judgment in favor of the Debtor, and to the entry of judgment against Debtor in the 
amount of $2,610,000.00 upon remand, ("Judgment Provision"), 
Debtor was the only party that objected to the settlement, which was approved by the 
bankruptcy court on July 21, 2014, in an Order Granting Trustee's Motions For Order Approving: 
(1) Settlement Between The Trustee and The Hardy Parties and (2) Settlement Between The 
Trustee and The Lexon Parties. After Debtor's discharge was granted on July 30, 2014, he filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the settlement, but this was also denied. Debtor 
and two creditors, FFAF Properties ("FFAF'') and Bennet Tueller Johnson & Deere ("BTJD"), 
proceeded to appeal to this court the order approving the Hardy Lenders' settlement.2 Before this 
court all appellants object to the Assignment Provision. Debtor also objects to the Judgment 
Provision. After filing his notice of appeal, Debtor requested the bankruptcy court enter a stay 
pending appeal. When the motion was denied, Debtor did not appeal from the decision or request 
a stay from this court. Neither FF AF or BTJD sought a stay from the bankruptcy court or this 
court. 
In the absence of a stay, the bankruptcy court approved the Trustee's Final Report on 
March I 0, 2015, and the Trustee made final distribution of the assets to the allowed claims and as 
provided in the settlement agreement. The Trustee now moves the court to dismiss this appeal on 
the grounds of constitutional and equitable mootness. The Hardy Lenders also move to dismiss on 
the additional grounds that appellants Jack standing; that the claims concerning the Assignment 
Provision are not ripe; and that the appeal is statutorily, constitutionally, and equitably moot. 
2 FFAF filed this appeal as assignee of Claim 12- I, originally filed by creditor Zions First National Bank, C'Zions 
Bank"). (Bankr. Dkt. No. 450). 
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ANALYSIS 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I ). On appeal, 
the bankruptcy court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, 
while its legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. In re Herd, 840 F.2d 757, 759 (I 0th Cir. 1988). 
However, before the court can reach the merits of the appeal, it must satisfy itself that the case 
presents a justiciable controversy and that all issues raised are properly before the court. See 
Anderson v. West (In re Anderson}, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7088 (10th Cir. Apr. 29, 2015). 
I. Standing 
Parties appealing from a bankruptcy court order bear the burden of demonstrating that 
they possess the requisite standing to bring their challenge before the district court. See Lopez v. 
Beh/es (In re Am. Ready Mix), 14 F.3d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1994). The requirements for such 
standing are more stringent than the case or controversy standing requirement of Article III. 
Nintendo Co. v. Patten (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 71 F .3d 353, 357 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995). "As 
a general matter, in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee alone has standing to raise issues before 
the bankruptcy court and to prosecute appeals." Flynn v. Finch (In re Colorado Mountain Cellars, 
Inc.), 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2868, *7 (I 0th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998) (quoting Richman v. First 
Woman's Bank (In re Richman), 104 F.3d 654, 657 ( 4th Cir. 1997)). 
A. Debtor 
For a debtor to have appellate standing, he must qualify as a person aggrieved, with his 
rights or interests being directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the bankruptcy 
court. In re C. W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011). "Accordingly, [l] 'unless the 
estate is solvent and excess will eventually go to the debtor, or [2] unless the matter involves 
rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a party aggrieved by orders affecting the 
5 
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administration of the bankruptcy estate."' Id. 
Debtor does not maintain that the estate is solvent or that he will receive an equity 
participation in the bankruptcy estate. Instead, he argues that his discharge is compromised by the 
Judgment Provision. SpecificaJly, Debtor claims that if judgment is entered, he wilJ be burdened 
with post discharge liability that would be reflected on his credit report, that he would be required 
to explain that the liability was discharged in bankruptcy whenever he applies for credit, and that 
lenders might not offer him credit, or do so on less favorable terms. He also contends that because 
the bankruptcy court allowed the Hardy Lenders' claims, there is no need for them to resume the 
Guaranty Action (requiring that he retain counsel and file pleadings) in order to pursue fraudulent 
transfer claims. As to the Assignment Provision, Debtor's only alleged harm is that he will be 
subject to discovery and will have to testify as a witness at trial. 
Post discharge prosecution of claims is contemplated and permitted by the bankruptcy 
code. Section 524(e) allows a creditor to bring or continue an action directly against the debtor for 
the purpose of establishing the debtor's liability when establishing liability is a prerequisite to 
recover from another entity. In re Walker, 927 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 1991). This 
exception to section 524(a)'s post-discharge injunction "hinges 'upon the condition that the 
debtor not be personally liable in a way that would interfere with the debtor's fresh start in 
economic life.'" Id.,· see also Paulv. Iglehart (In re Paul), 534 F.3d 1303, 1307-1308 (10th Cir. 
2008). Under UTAH CODE ANN. §25-6-6, the transfers in question would only be fraudulent if the 
Hardy Lenders had a claim against Debtor that arose before the transfers were made. Becaus~ the 
state court dismissed Debtor from the guaranty action for lack of personal liability, the entry of 
judgment against him may be necessary to avoid preclusion issues that could hinder recovery 
from third parties. 
6 
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Given that judgments for discharged debts are void pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524, it is 
improbable that Debtor will be harmed by the entry of a judgment in the Guaranty Action.3 In the 
event that the Hardy Lenders were to attempt to collect on the state court judgment, Debtor would 
have recourse to seek sanctions for violation of the discharge order. In re Paul, 534 F.3d at 1306-
7. Debtor has also failed to present any evidence that a void post discharge judgment would affect 
his credit prospects beyond the impact that his Chapter 7 bankruptcy-which will remain on his 
credit report for ten years-has already had, that he will not be able to persuade creditors that the 
claims have been discharged, or that he will receive credit on less favorable terms.4 Because 
Debtor bears the burden of establishing he has standing, he cannot rely on mere speculative hann. 
As such, the court concludes that Debtor lacks standing to appeal from the Judgment Provision. 
Debtor also lacks standing to challenge the Assignment Provision because it does not 
involve "rights unique to the debtor." There is no contention that any recovery from the assigned 
claims is exempt property, or that debtor will be subject to personal liability, given that said 
claims are against third parties. See Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 F .3d 860, 864 n.3 (10th 
Cir. 1994). As such, the only rights in question are those of the estate's creditors, who stand to 
receive payment for their outstanding claims based on the outcome of the assigned actions. 
Because Debtor "is not relieved of the responsibility [he] has, as do all citizens, to testify at trial 
and/or participate in discovery as a witness," he also fails tq allege any cognizable hann suffered 
as a result ofthis provision. In re Paul, 534 F.3d at 1307. 
3 While the bankruptcy court's order approving the settlement agreement lifts the automatic stay "to allow the Third 
District Court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in the contempt proceeding," it does not permit the 
entry or prosecution of a monetary judgment against Debtor. (Dkt. No. 47-1, ~ 13.A). If Debtor believes that the 
Hardy Lenders have acted beyond the scope of the aforementioned provision, his remedy lies with the bankruptcy 
court. 
4 The harms alleged by Debtor would occur every time a judgment is entered after discharge. Despite that being the 
case, such suits have been permitted to allow recovery from third parties. 
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B. FFAF and BTJD 
"Prerequisites for being a 'person aggrieved' are attendance and objection at a bankruptcy 
court proceeding." In re Weston, 18 F.3d at 684 (quoting Matter a/Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 
956 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1992)). Neither FFAF's predecessor in interest, Zions Bank, nor 
BTJD raised any objections to the settlement with the bankruptcy court or joined in Debtor's 
motion to reconsider. Accordingly, they lack standing to appeal the validity of the Assignment 
Provision. 
All appellants attempt to sidestep their lack of standing by arguing that the bankruptcy 
code does not permit the Trustee's assignment of the estate's claims to a creditor, and as such, the 
bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to approve a settlement with such a provision. 
In essence, their argument is that a bankruptcy court's order approving a settlement is a question 
of subject matter jurisdiction, and not one on the merits of the bankruptcy. The argument fails. 
The Trustee's motion for an order approving the settlement was a core proceeding as defined in 
28 U .S.C. § I 57(b )(2), because it addressed matters concerning the administration of the estate, 
the allowance of claims, the approval of a sale of property, and affected the liquidation of assets 
of the estate. It was also consistent with FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a), which states that "[o]n 
motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the [bankruptcy] court may approve a 
compromise or settlement." Having subject matter jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court was free to 
grant or deny the Trustee's motion. Appellant's failure to object, and thus preserve their 
arguments, prevents them from appealing the correctness of the decision. 
II. Mootness 
A. Constitutional and Equitable Mootness 
An appeal of a bankruptcy court order is constitutiona1ly moot where "the appellee 
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demonstrates that a court could order no meaningful relief to the party seeking reversal of the 
bankruptcy court's decision." Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 
1330 (10th Cir. 2009). Even if an appeal is not constitutionally moot, the underlying 
circumstances may make it inequitable for the court to grant the requested relief.5 To determine 
whether an appeal is equitably moot, the Tenth Circuit considers the following factors: 
(1) Has the appellant sought and/or obtained a stay pending appeal? (2) Has the 
appealed plan been substantially consummated? (3) Will the rights of innocent 
third parties be adversely affected by reversal ofthe confirmed plan? (4) Will the 
public-policy need for reliance on the confirmed bankruptcy plan-and the need 
for creditors generally to be able to rely on bankruptcy court decisions-be 
undermined by reversal of the plan? (5) If appellant's challenge were upheld, what 
would be the likely impact upon a successful reorganization of the debtor? And (6) 
based upon a quick look at the merits of appellant's challenge to the plan, is 
appellant's chalJenge legally meritorious or equitably compelling? 
Id. at 1339. 
Both the Trustee and the Hardy Lenders contend that this appeal is moot because the 
bankruptcy court approved the final distribution, and the estate's funds have been disbursed to 
creditors with allowed claims. Appellants reply that they are not challenging the settlement 
agreement as a whole, and that they do not seek a reversal of the distributions that have already 
been made. Instead, they contend that their appeal is limited to "two isolated and narrow aspects," 
the alleged invalidity of the Judgment and Assi_gnment Provision. (Dkt. No. 47, p. I). The 
requested relief is for the court to strike the objected portions. In effect, appellants are asking the 
court to rewrite the settlement agreement. 
The settlement agreement, however, contains no severability clause, and the provisions in 
5 While the Tenth Circuit has applied equitable mootness in Chapter 11 cases, they have not addressed its 
applicability it in Chapter 7 cases. This court has previously applied equitable mootness in the liquidation context, 
noting that "no circuit has affinnatively held equitable mootness inapplicable," and that "[a]fter a thorough review of 
the relevant case law, the Court is persuaded that equitable mootness should apply." ANR Co. v. Rushton, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 61795, * 11 n.23 (D. Utah May 2, 2012); see also Davis v. Shepard, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82804, *20-
21 n.10 (N.D. Ala. June 18, 2014); but see liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. D.J. Christie, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177977, 
*7-9 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 2013). 
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questions are a central part of the agreement, without which "there would have been no bargain 
whatever." United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 298-299 (1942); Security 
Underground Storage, Inc. v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 967-968 (10th Cir. 1965). This becomes 
clear when considering that even if the Hardy Lenders' bankruptcy claims against Debtor were 
allowed, they would not be able to collect on them after his discharge. As such, the provisions 
allowing them to prosecute fraudulent transfers against third parties would be the only means of 
recovery left to them. This satisfies the court that the settlement provisions are not severable. 
The only alternative--reversing the bankruptcy court's order approving the settlement and 
undoing the agreement-is practically impossible at this point. To begin with, the funds that have 
been distributed to non-parties to this appeal, including several creditors and the law firm 
representing the trustee, cannot be disgorged. See In re Blumer, 66 B.R. I 09, 113 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1986) ("Effective relief is impossible if funds have been disbursed to persons who are not parties 
to the appeal."). In addition, the Lexon Parties received payment of their reduced claims pursuant 
to their settlement with the Trustee. There being no appeal over the bankruptcy court's approval 
of the Lexon Parties' settlement, the court lacks authority to require a return of the funds paid.6 
Even if some sort of relief could be fashioned, there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances due to the final distribution of the estate that would make reversal equitably moot. 
While Debtor sought a stay from the bankruptcy court, this was denied, and no request for a stay 
was made to this court. FF AF and BTJD never even attempted to procure a stay. The result has 
been a substantial consummation of the agreement appellants would now like to revise, and the 
final distribution of the estate's assets. A reversal at this stage would adversely affect all creditors. 
Not only would it require them to return the funds they received, which they more than likely 
6 There are also due process concerns because the Lexon Parties have never been afforded notice or the opportunity to 
be heard as to the invalidation of their settlement. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 
( 1950). 
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have already spent, it would also undo the settlement of the Lexon Parties-the second largest 
creditor of the estate. Such a result would seriously undermine the ability of parties to rely on the 
finality of settlements approved by bankruptcy courts. It is of significant importance that if the 
plan were to be set aside, the Trustee has stated that there is no likelihood of reaching a new 
settlement. (Dkt. No. 42-3, p. 55-56). With the remaining assets abandoned, creditors would 
receive no payment on their claims. 
Finally, there is a strong likelihood that the Hardy Lenders would prevail on the merits of 
their appeal before this court. As discussed above, the post-discharge judgment in the Guaranty 
Action appears to be necessary to prosecute third party fraudulent transfers, and will not 
compromise Debtor's discharge. With regards to the Assignment Provision, the Tenth Circuit has 
not directly spoken on the question of whether a creditor may derivatively prosecute estate causes 
of action. Addressing whether the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2000), undermined this Circuit's previous practice of 
allowing those actions, the Tenth Circuit noted that "other circuits have continued to allow 
committees to bring avoidance actions." Hill v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (In re MS55, Inc.), 477 F .3d 
1131, 1139 n. 9 ( l 0th Cir. 2007). This court agrees with the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Kansas' conclusion in Vil/. of Overland Pointe, LLC v. Terra Bentley II, LLC (In re Bentley II, 
LLC) that there is "no reason to believe the Tenth Circuit would disagree with the unanimous 
view of the Circuits that have decided the question." 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 806, *11 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. Mar. 2, 20 I I) (noting that "[n]o Circuit court appears to have conc]uded derivative standing 
for creditors is never permissible" and discussing applicable precedents); Springs East Land Co., 
LLC v. Goss (In re Ellicott Springs Res., LLC), 485 B.R. 626, 636 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013). 
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B. Statutory Mootness 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), "The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization 
under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity 
of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in 
good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such 
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal." 
While Debtor contends that no sale has taken place, the Tenth Circuit has held that 
"[dispossession] of assets in accordance with [a] compromise and settlement renders [an] appeal 
moot under Bankruptcy Rule 8005 and 11 U .S.C. § 363(m)." Weatherford v. Bonney, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 31594, *3-4 (10th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993). The assigned claims constitute assets of the 
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l). As §"363(b) is the primary section allowing for 
the sale of part of the debtor's property, other than in the ordinary course of business," the 
bankruptcy court is not required to denote the sale as being made pursuant to § 363(b) for the 
protection of§ 363(m) to apply. See In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986). However, 
the court recognizes that no party made a request for the bankruptcy court to make a specific 
finding of good faith. Accordingly, even were the appeal not constitutionally or equitably moot, 
the appropriate remedy would be a remand to the bankruptcy court for specific findings with 
regards to the Hardy Lenders' good faith. Guadano v. Holbrook (In re lndep. Gas & Oil 
Producers, Inc.), 80 Fed. Appx. 95, I 00 (10th Cir. 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore ORDERED that the Trustee's and the Hardy Lenders' Motions to Dismiss, 
(0kt. Nos. 25, 29), are GRANTED. 
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DATED this 2ihday of May, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
~✓d~ 
Clark Waddoups 
United States District Court Judge 
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1 Because the is a Joint Memorandum in Opposition to two separate Motions filed by the Trustee (Doc. #25) and the 
Hardy Lenders (Doc. # 29), counsel for Rindelsbach determined that a Motion for Lengthy Memorandum was not 
required. Though neither the Trustee nor the Hardy Party's stated the basis for the Motion under Rules of Civil, 
Appellate, or Bankruptcy Procedure, as the Motions seek to dismiss the appeal, it is appropriate that Rindlesbach be 
given 25 pages to respond to each Motion, exclusive of the facts under DUCivR 7-l(e). 
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Debtor, Mark Lee Rindlesbach (the "debtor"), respectfully submits this pleading in 
opposition to the motions of the chapter 7 trustee, Philip G. Jones (the "trustee"), and creditors 
known as the "Hardy Lenders" to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the issues presented no 
longer are justiciable. After setting forth the factual and procedural background which give 
context and perspective to the motions to dismiss, the debtor will address first the contentions of 
the trustee and then those of the Hardy Lenders. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND TO THE MOTIONS OF 
THE TRUSTEE AND THE HARDY LENDERS TO DISMISS THE APPEAL 
The debtor has appealed from the Order Granting Trustee's Motions For Order 
Approving: (1) Settlement Between The Trustee And The Hardy Parties And (2) Settlement 
Between The Trustee And The Lexon Parties (Bankruptcy Doc. No. 361) entered by the 
Honorable Joel Marker (the "Order"). A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit I. The Order 
approved a Settlement Agreement between the trustee, on behalf of the debtor's estate 
inbankruptcy, and a consortium of creditors which are known as the Hardy Lenders (the 
~-settlement Agreement"). A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2. While 
the Settlement Agreement between these parties reflects a compromise of a large number of 
disputed issues and a lot of money, the debtor challenges only two isolated and narrow aspects of 
the Settlement Agreement on the basis that they are unlawful and beyond the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of federal courts sitting in bankruptcy. The debtor gives a comprehensive view of 
the Settlement Agreement in the Opening Brief of Appellant/Debtor Mark Lee Rindlesbach 
(Doc. 23) ("Debtor's Opening Brief'), which is incorporated by reference. The debtor invites 
the court to review Debtor's Opening Brief in order to get a larger perspective on what is at stake 
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The Hardy Lenders, speaking through their counsel, did not contradict the trustee's 
position that the post-discharge judgments bore no relation to questions involving the 
administration of the estate in bankruptcy. For their part, however, counsel suggested that the 
$2,610,000 judgment in state court was important because without it the debtor might attempt to 
argue that the money wasn't owed - surely a specious argument at the time since the Settlement 
Agreement in bankruptcy court provided a final adjudication of the amount owed in an allowed 
claim and the functional equivalent of a judgment which supersedes any proceedings in state 
court. It is true that the Hardy Lenders indicated to Judge Marker that they wanted the 
$2,610,000 judgment in the Guaranty Case so that they could pursue fraudulent transfer 
collections against non-debtor third parties, but, here again, they did not (and cannot) explain 
why a state court judgment is needed when they already, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, 
have a stipulated judgment in the bankruptcy court. Nothing was said to justify the contempt 
judgment which, as to the debtor, is discharged, and, as to the estate, isn't even allowed as a 
claim.3 
At the hearing on approval of the Settlement Agreement, Judge Marker repeatedly 
questioned counsel about the implications of what the debtor is calling the anti-discharge 
paragraphs of the Settlement Agreement. See July 2, 2014, Hearing Transcript, at pages 30, 42-
3 The Hardy Lenders' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #29), filed in tandem with the trustee's motion (Doc. #25), suggests, 
on one reading, that the Lenders may have conceded that a post-discharge judgment in the Guaranty Case at least is 
unnecessary, that all they want in the Guaranty Appeal is reversal of the summary judgment and remand to the trial 
court where, in light of the Order, nothing further need be done. It is gratifying that the Lenders, however tardily, 
have come to this understanding, but the debtor's problem on this score is that the Order permits the entry of a 
judgment in the trial court and, but for the pressing of this appeal, the debtor never might have seen this post hoc 
change of heart. What's more, in light of the litigation history between the parties, the debtor is entitled to doubt 
that, notwithstanding what might be a disclaimer of interest here by the Hardy Lenders, if this appeal is dismissed, 
the Lenders won't follow through with what is authorized in the bankruptcy court order and obtain the entry of 
judgments against him. This "voluntary cessation" issue is discussed more completely below in the context of the 
jurisprudence respecting standing and mootness. 
7 
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ni I, because there was no reorganization in this case, and, even if we treat the Settlement 
Agreement as a form of reorganization, preventing a violation of the discharge will not upset that 
agreement. The trustee admits that the anti-discharge language in the Settlement Agreement 
doesn't matter to him. None of the creditors, excepting the Hardy Lenders, is concerned with the 
post-discharge judgments. The Hardy Lenders admit that the judgments, if entered, would be 
void, but still apparently want them for "collection purposes," although, as conceded in their 
briefing to the Utah Court of Appeals, they are entirely unnecessary to that end, since the Order 
approving the Settlement Agreement allows their claim and therefore gives them a judgment 
which fixes the amount they can collect when using the avoiding actions. Any judgment entered 
in state court, therefore, would be superfluous. If an analogy to contract law is appropriate, 
courts often sever illegal or immaterial portions of a bargained for exchange, leaving the balance 
of an agreement unharmed and enforceable. Whether, on a quick look, there is merit to the 
debtor's argument that the Settlement Agreement threatens his discharge, the court should 
review his merits brief. The bankruptcy judge's denial of a stay should not be considered in this 
regard for three reasons. First, to do so would make factor (6) duplicative of factor (I) in the 
Paige analysis. Second, the debtor fired a shotgun at the Settlement.Agreement below, 
challenging a wide range of issues, including its allowance of the Hardy Lender claims and 
proposed distribution of assets, and the bankruptcy judge's denial of a stay was a resolution of all 
of these, as opposed to the two narrower questions, as to the debtor's discharge and the Hardy 
Party's standing, which ultimately were raised on this appeal. Third, Judge Marker's comments, 
at the approval hearing, on the anti-discharge portions of the Settlement Agreement show that, in 
all probability, he had serious reservations about the enforceability of these provisions. In 
27 
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court order renders a further judgment in state court superfluous." Unfortunately, the 
Settlement Agreement, as well as the Order approving it, provides expressly that, in the 
Guaranty case, the $2,610,000 judgment against the debtor will be entered in two stipulated 
stages, first by reversal of the summary judgment at the Utah Court of Appeals and thereafter 
in a separate stipulation for entry of judgment in the trial court. Hence, what is said at the 
Utah Court of Appeals may not be the final word; the Settlement Agreement authorizes the 
Hardy Lenders, after a remand order on appeal, to obtain an actual judgment in the lower 
court. 
There is no assurance - except through pressing this appeal and striking this provision 
in the Settlement Agreement - that the Hardy Lenders will not insist on their rights before the 
state trial court, and, indeed, their motion papers before this court may be read to imply that 
they will do exactly that - first, in a backhanded manner, by insisting that were they to follow 
through and get the stipulated judgment from the trial court it would be void insofar as the 
debtor's discharge is concerned and, second, by showing what apparently is their true hand, 
by suggesting that, once the judgment is obtained, it's ok so long as it's used only to collect 
from third parties. 
It remains unclear, in the face of this argument, what the Hardy Lenders intend. There 
is simply no reason for a state court judgment where the Order, allowing the claim for 
$2,610,000, is all that is needed to resolve the appellate dispute and liquidate the amount 
which is payable and can be paid through the estate's assets including pursuit of avoiding 
actions. And yet the language in the Order remains and the Hardy Lenders make no clear 
38 
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itself screams inquiry notice by disclaiming that this transfer of fiducial responsibilities from 
the trustee to the Lenders will be workable or enforceable. 
As Judge Posner ruled in In the Matter of EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 948 (ih 
Cir. 1982), interpreting good faith under 11 U.S.C. § 364(e), which serves the same purpose 
for financing transactions as § 363(111) does for sales agreements, "Where it is evident from 
the ... agreement itself that the transaction has an intended effect that is improper under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the [buyer] is not in good faith, and it is irrelevant what the improper 
purpose is." 
From the discussion above - and in the debtor's opening merits brief -- concerning 
how the bankruptcy code hedges about the powers of the trustee, it is obvious that the exercise 
of these rights by the Hardy Lenders amounts to a violation of the law and this improper 
purpose betokens their want of good faith. Along the same lines, the Hardy Lenders' § 
363(111) argument is an effort, in effect, to create standing in the Lenders by a sort of estoppel, 
an effort which must be overruled under the jurisprudence of subject-matter jurisdiction in the 
federal courts. Where standing or subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, it cannot be 
created by the actions of the parties in a case -- through consent, waiver, estoppel or the like. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
The debtor respectfully asks this Honorable Court, for the reasons detailed above, to deny 
the Motion to Dismiss and immediately require the briefing schedule to be reinstated and 
schedule oral argument on the appeal. 
Dated this 8th day of April, 2015. 
Isl Alan Smith 
Alan Smith 
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PAUL TOSCANO, P.C. 
Isl Paul Toscano 
Paul Toscano 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Isl Stacy J. McNeill 
James K. Tracy 
Stacy J. Mc Neill 
Attorneys for Debtor/Appellant 
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